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ASSESSING THE "CONTRACT FAILURE" EXPLANATION FOR
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
DANIEL SHAVIRO*

The best known account in recent legal or economic literature of why
certain organizations use the nonprofit form, and when or why they ought
to be tax-exempt, comes from Henry Hansmann.l Hansmann argues that
the nonprofit form prevails where it does because it responds efficiently
to problems of "contract failure" where behavior is hard to monitor.2 For
example, I might not trust a for-profit company to use my donation to
provide famine relief in a foreign country or to render "complex personal
services" such as nursing care, given the difficulty of observing
performance directly. 3 The nonprofit structure is supposed to increase
one's confidence in the company's good-faith behavior.4
Hansmann further argues that the nonprofit form can lead to inefficient
under-investment in the sectors to which it is best suited, since nonprofits
cannot attract conventional equity capital and have difficulty even
attracting sufficient loan capital.5 Tax exemption could be seen as
responding to this inefficiency by allowing nonprofits to keep more of
whatever cash they nonetheless succeed in attracting.6
How well do Hansmann's arguments hold up after close to twenty
years? Overall, I would say they hold up well, but they are better at

explaining nonprofits than at supporting tax exemption. 7 Moreover,
Hansmann mainly emphasizes only one of the two key characteristics that
nonprofit organizations generally share. In addition to being nonprofit in
form, they generally provide services in fields that have a certain aura of
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am grateful to Henry
Hansmann and John Simon for comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835
(1980).
2. See id. at 845.
3. See id. at 846.
4. See id. at 851-54. Hansmann notes, however, that nonprofit status "is a rather
crude consumer protection device." Id. at 871.
5. See Henry Hansmann, The RationaleforExemptingNonprofit Organizationsfrom
CorporateIncome Tacation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
6. See id. at 72-75.
7. See id. at 96. Hansmann argues far more strongly for the claim that the
under-investment view provides the best available argument for nonprofits' tax exemption
than for the claim that this view in fact supports the treatment of nonprofits under present
law. See id. at 72-75.

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41

virtue or public-spiritedness, making the word "charitable" not wholly
inapposite. Consider § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which
lists the following exempt purposes: religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, educational, and prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.' The nonprofit field was characterized by this focus
on charity, virtue, or public-spiritedness even before the income tax
created incentives for the link. 9 Surely both of the typical nonprofit's two
key defining characteristics are important, and perhaps the greatest interest
lies in explaining their overlap.
I. EXPLAINING NONPROFITS
With regard to explaining nonprofits, my favorite example to test the
contract failure view is automobile repair shops. Here is a "complex
personal service" or a setting rife with "contract failure," if ever there was
one. All car-owners know the feeling of being told, "in addition to the oil
change, you also need two thousand dollars of engine work." They often
agree to have the costly extra work done because the risk of a car
breakdown is high and they cannot judge for themselves, but certainly the
for-profit setting arouses deep distrust. So why (so far as I know) are
there no nonprofit automobile repair shops?
Hansmann discusses this very example,'" but to my mind does not
make quite enough of it. He suggests that, when people are buying private
goods for their own personal consumption, contract failure is unlikely to
be bad enough to require the very crude response that nonprofit status
offers."
Presumably, the claim is that, in the private personal
consumption setting, good faith performance is easier to observe. But is
that really true? In the automobile repair case, how likely am I ever to
find out if I needed the engine work that I agreed to? Is the case any
different from, say, medical services, in which nonprofits play a major
role? Indeed, is getting the needed information harder here than in the
foreign famine relief case, where industry concentration, embodied by
organizations such as the Red Cross, UNICEF, and the United Way,
provides a stronger reputational bond than one can find in what is
8. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
9. See, e.g., W. HARRISON WELLFORD & JANNE G. GALLAGHER, UNFAIR
THE CHALLENGE TO CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 29-46 (1988)
(discussing the historical tradition of nonprofit enterprise, in part to support the separate
point that charging fees for charitable services has long been common).
10. See Hansmann, supranote 1, at 868-72.
COMPETITION?

11. See id. at 871.
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clearly-presumably due to factors that affect the efficient scale2 of
production-the more decentralized realm of repairing automobiles?
Thus, one must examine more closely why there are nonprofits in such
fields as charity work, the "high"-though generally not popular-arts,
education, and medicine, but not in automobile repair, even though the
"contract failure" problem may apply with comparable force to all. I
think the answer can be approached from either the demand side, where
people decide how to spend their money (with regard to both donations
and purchases), or the supply side, where people decide what services to
offer and in what settings to offer the services.
Curbing the profit motive through use of the nonprofit form initially
leaves us with a black box. Yes, it may ease certain concerns about good
faith performance, but what remains in their place? What all the typical
nonprofit areas have in common is a fair chance of attracting workers who
care about nonprofits; for example, people who want to do charity work,
public radio, or academic scholarship, and may even be willing to accept
a lower salary to do this sort of work. Prospective donors or service
buyers know that these people exist, and not only worry less about bad
faith or abuse, but have in mind a plausible and reassuring set of
alternative motivations.
Someone who tried to offer automobile repair services on a nonprofit
basis would have difficulty inspiring similar confidence. Prospective
customers would probably conclude that it was either a scam, or that the
lack of a profit motive did more harm than good by discouraging
assiduous effort. Imagine what quality of service most people might
expect if a government bureaucracy, with its similar lack of profit
motive-say, New York's Department of Motor Vehicles-began offering
automobile repair services to residents.
Shifting to the supply side, 3 suppose that you were thinking of
establishing a nonprofit organization. Given the bar on attracting
conventional equity, could you at least receive cheap and highly motivated
labor? Here the loosely charitable activity focus is crucial. You might
find people who want to do alms work, public radio, or scholarship, and
who would forego a higher salary elsewhere, but it would be hard to find
12. See id. at 870-71. Hansmann agrees that the efficient scale of production in an
industry is important, and notes that where it is small the nonprofit form may make little
difference in service providers' expected behavior. While he rightly emphasizes that the
nonprofit constraint can make more of a difference in large organizations, he does not
rebut the possibility that they also have an offsetting lesser need for the constraint because
of their greater ability to post an effective reputational bond. See id.
13. See id. at 899-901. While Hansmann mainly provides a demand side explanation

for nonprofit organizations, he provisionally sketches a supply side argument that
resembles my own in an appendix. See id.
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automobile repairmen with the same sentiments. In the traditional
charitable fields, your nonprofit status might help to reassure them that
you would do it in a suitable way, in effect, solving their contract failure
problem as prospective employees. So, in the traditional nonprofit fields
but not others, nonprofit organizations may have a supply side as well as
a demand side advantage.
I would revise Hansmann's "contract failure" theory to rely more
clearly and explicitly on expected taste. The taste element involves the
fact that, in general, only nonprofits in fields with a loosely charitable,
virtuous, or public-spirited halo or aura attract, and are known to attract,
a certain type of motivated individual. In the end, however, Hansmann
and I differ here in little beyond emphasis. He concedes that the nonprofit
form may work better in some areas than others "for reasons rooted in
cultural norms or individual preferences."' 4 That he does not pursue this
may reflect a tradition among economists, exemplified in a famous article
by Gary Becker and George Stigler called De Gustibus Non Est
Disputandum,"5 urging that one try to explain as many phenomena as
possible without relying on detailed claims about people's underlying
taste." Relying on detailed claims about taste can be a type of cheating,
because it often short-circuits empirical testing and might be made
unnecessary by working harder within the more parsimonious conventional
premises. Here, however, I believe it is unavoidable.

II. EXPLAINING TAX EXEMPTION
Why are nonprofits often tax-exempt? Without exemption, nonprofits
would not only owe income tax, but also sales and property taxes, and
they would pay higher postal rates. Whether or not these exemptions, low
rates, and other benefits, such as the charitable deduction, are in the end
correct policy, there is widespread agreement that they are at least
plausible. Thus, even Stanley Surrey, the great foe of nearly all special
incentives within the income tax, thought some form of government aid to
charitable organizations might be justified.' 7
Hansmann is right to dismiss the earlier argument for income tax
exemption by Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, which focuses on the
14.
15.
67 AM.
16.

Id. at 871.
See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,
ECON. REv. 76 (1977).
See id. at 76.
17. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 230-32 (1973).
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alleged impossibility of measuring nonprofits' taxable income.' 8 Bittker
and Rahdert treat as insoluble conundrums such questions as: Are
donations income? If not, then what expenses should be disallowed as
linked to income? At what rate should charitable organizations be taxed? 9
Hansmann notes that these arguments only apply to the income tax and
cannot explain the broader policy of tax exemption." He adds that it
would be quite easy to treat donations as income, and treat the cost of
providing charitable services as business expenses.2 '
Even if one has a taste for income tax formalism, and thus believes
that the key question is what the word "income" really means, this is a
very plausible move. Henry Simons pointed out that gifts make recipients
better off and are notionally part of their income, while also a kind of
consumption expenditure by donors. 22 These arguments extend quite well
to the charitable entity setting, where, absent any grounds for subsidy,
taxing the organization, net of its expenses, could be thought a reasonable
proxy for taxing its beneficiaries directly, despite the conceded
impossibility-rather over-emphasized by Bittker and Rahdert-of taxing
them at precisely the right rate.'
More fundamentally still, however, as Hansmann puts it in a notable
early critique of the tradition of income tax formalism,
simple analogies and metaphors .. .will not yield a satisfying
answer as to whether or not we should tax the net earnings of
nonprofit organizations. Rather, we must examine and judge the
18. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit

Organizationsfrom FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
19. See id. at 307-14.
20. See Hansmann, supra note 5, at 58-62.

21. See id.
22. See HENRY

C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF

INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 56-58 (1938). A similar argument is made
in JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND POLICY

103 (1989). There is, of course, the well-known argument by William Andrews that gifts
ought in principle to be deducted from donors' income because the donated funds are not
tangibly consumed by them. See William D. Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal
Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 348 (1972). While my objection to Andrews's
argument is ultimately substantive, his view can be criticized even in more formalist
terms, as relying on a rather fine and poorly motivated distinction between different
voluntary uses of funds. Why is one person better-off than another (and thus deemed to
have more income) simply because she has a taste for making donative transfers rather
than, say, for attending theatrical or sporting events?
23. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 18, at 314-16. The difficulty of picking the
precisely correct proxy tax rate hardly necessitates choosing a rate of zero.
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actual consequences of imposing such a tax. That is, we must
consider what the world would look like both with and without
such a tax, and then decide which world we like better.24
Thus, the case for allowing nonprofits to be tax-exempt must be based
on providing a desirable subsidy, rather than simply following form or the
definition of income. However, I find Hansmann's rationale for the
subsidy unsatisfying, or at least tangential. He argues that, once the
nonprofit form prevails, or at least is part of the mix in particular sectors
of the economy, those sectors may tend to suffer from inefficient underinvestment.' Nonprofits cannot attract equity capital by offering investors
a profit share, and they ostensibly have trouble borrowing enough capital
from banks and other lenders.
I have two problems with this argument. First, the nonprofit form
impedes capital flows in both directions. It does not merely deter capital
from flowing in, but also prevents capital from flowing out. If John and
Catherine MacArthur had left their money to the automobile industry, it
would have flowed right back out as soon as profitability, reflecting the
optimal level of investment in that industry, declined. Because they left
it to a charitable foundation, however, it will stay in the charitable sector
indefinitely.
Given the two-way character of the impediments to capital flow, how
do we know that nonprofit investment is too low relative to other
investment? Even if new charitable needs are always arising, tax
exemption may do little good on balance if it mainly locks in capital to old
charitable organizations where the need for it is no longer as great.
To be sure, Hansmann agrees that this can happen, and that undercapitalization is only a possibility, not a certainty. 26 He has argued that
exemption should be withdrawn where there is evidence of overcapitalization, as perhaps in the case of hospitals. 27 My conclusion is that,
in general, there is no systematic reason to expect under-investment that
calls for a subsidy, rather than over-investment that might perhaps call for
a penalty, because of the two-way impediments to capital flow.
My second problem with the under-capitalization argument for tax
exemption is that difficulty in attracting equity capital is simply one part
24. Hansmann, supranote 5, at 64.
25. See id. at 72.
26. See id. at 74-75.
27. See Henry Hansmann, The Changing Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit
Enterprise in Education, Health Care, and Other Human Services, in INDIVIDUAL AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM
CARE INAMERICA 245, 255 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996).
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of the trade-off between the profit and nonprofit forms of enterprise.28
Similarly, the corporate form is superior to the partnership form in some
respects but inferior in others. Where there are two alternative forms and
each has the virtues of its vices and vice versa, it does not necessarily
follow that one form ought to be subsidized by reason of one of the vices.
The weakening in the nonprofit sector of the profit motive's beneficial
consequences for incentives, and the fact that certain investors therefore
do not want to contribute resources to it, are relevant to the optimal
allocation of resources as between sectors of the economy.
Thus, in the end I believe that the under-capitalization argument adds
little, if anything, to the case for exempting nonprofit organizations from
tax. In this regard, Hansmann and I may not greatly disagree, because he
concludes that it leaves "the justification for the exemption ... less clearcut than has commonly been supposed."29 I believe that fundamentally the
case for tax exemption, as well as other special tax and non-tax benefits
for nonprofit organizations, must rest squarely, and more or less
exclusively, on the view that the activities these organizations engage in
merit public support. The basic argument, which may fail to support the
benefits enjoyed by some § 501(c)(3) organizations, rests on two main
claims. First, the organizations are providing public goods or engaging
in activities that have positive externalities. And second, in areas where
the organizations are active, decentralized private provision is either
preferable-at least in part-to direct government provision, or necessary
in practice to compensate for government's failure to do all that it should.
Now this may seem, no less than the under-investment argument, to
emphasize only one of the organizations' two linked qualities: nonprofit
form and broadly charitable purpose. Here, however, I would return to
Hansmann's contract failure argument, as modified above. Taxpayers,
when deciding which charitable organizations to subsidize, are in much the
same position as individuals deciding where to direct their consumer or
donor dollars. Thus, taxpayers are properly encouraged by the nonprofit
constraint in cases where a reassuring alternative set of motivations seems
plausible. This brings us full circle to an appreciation of Hansmann's
seminal contribution.

28. Cf. Hansmann, supra note 5, at 74 (noting this objection).
29. Id. at 96.

